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Abstract The Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen
in Percept Psychophys 16:143–149, 1974) was distributed
among pairs of participants to investigate whether indi-
viduals take into account a co-actor’s S–R mapping even
when coordination is not required. Participants responded
to target letters (Experiment 1) or colors (Experiment 2)
surrounded by distractors. When performing their part of
the task next to another person performing the comple-
mentary part of the task, participants responded more
slowly to stimuli containing flankers that were potential
targets for their co-actor (incompatible trials), compared to
stimuli containing identical, compatible, or neutral flank-
ers. This joint Flanker effect also occurred when partici-
pants merely believed to be performing the task with a co-
actor (Experiment 3). Furthermore, Experiment 4 demon-
strated that people form shared task representations only
when they perceive their co-actor as intentionally con-
trolling her actions. These findings substantiate and gen-
eralize earlier results on shared task representations and
advance our understanding of the basic mechanisms sub-
serving joint action.
Keywords Joint action  Task sharing  Shared
representations  Action anticipation
Introduction
In many situations, people act in close proximity to one
another be it in a factory, in an open-plan office, cycling in
the Tour de France, or simply walking along the street.
Even when people act alone and do not intend to coordinate
with others, their performance is shaped by others’ actions.
This general principle manifests itself in a variety of dif-
ferent phenomena, ranging from social facilitation over
entrainment and perception–action interference to task
co-representation.
The term ‘social facilitation’ refers to the phenomenon
that people perform (simple) tasks more quickly in the
mere presence of others (Aiello and Douthitt 2001; Guerin
1993; Zajonc 1965). This finding holds in situations where
neither cooperation nor competition is critical for task
performance and is thought to be due to differences in
arousal.
More recently, research on interpersonal entrainment
has revealed that when people perform cyclic actions like
swinging pendulums (Amazeen et al. 1995; Richardson
et al. 2005; Schmidt et al. 1998), walking (van Ulzen et al.
2008), or rocking in rocking chairs (Richardson et al. 2007)
next to each other, they tend to fall into the same rhythm.
This indicates that dynamical principles of intrapersonal
coordination also hold for the interpersonal case (Marsh
et al. 2009).
A third way in which others’ actions affect performance
is demonstrated by studies of perception–action interfer-
ence. People are faster and more accurate at performing
actions when they concurrently observe someone else
performing the same action, and they are slower and less
accurate when they see another person performing an
opposite action (Brass et al. 2000, 2001; Kilner et al. 2003;
Longo et al. 2008; Stuermer et al. 2000). For example,
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participants can lift their index finger more quickly when
seeing someone lifting their index finger compared to
seeing the middle finger being lifted (Brass et al. 2001).
These results indicate that observing an action activates
motor programs also involved in performing the same
action, as proposed by common coding theory (Prinz
1997). The notion of common representations for action
performance and action perception is well supported by
neurophysiological and brain-imaging studies (for an
overview, see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010).
Finally, cognitive and social scientists have started to
distribute tasks between two co-actors to investigate whe-
ther individuals form similar task representations when
task performance is shared and when the whole task is
performed alone. The terms ‘task co-representation’ and
‘shared task representations’ refer to the idea that during
joint task performance, each co-actor represents not only
her own part, but also the part to be performed by the
co-actor.
In a first study, Sebanz et al. (2003) distributed a spatial
compatibility task between two people to test whether
individuals integrate a co-actor’s action alternative in their
action planning. In the standard version of this task (e.g.,
Simon 1990), a single person performs right and left key
presses in response to targets of two different colors (two-
choice RT task). For instance, red targets might require a
left response, and green targets a right response. The targets
occur in different positions on the screen (e.g., left side vs.
right side), yet target position is irrelevant to task
performance. Nonetheless, the irrelevant spatial dimension
of the stimuli interferes with responses. Reaction times
(RTs) are faster when a stimulus appears on the side of the
response to be given (compatible trials, e.g., red target
appearing on the left) compared to when the stimulus
appears on the opposite side of the response (incompatible
trials). This compatibility effect is explained by the
dimensional overlap model (Kornblum et al. 1990;
Kornblum and Lee 1995), according to which the irrelevant
spatial feature of the stimulus triggers an automatic
response activation because the irrelevant stimulus dimen-
sion and features of the response overlap. On incompatible
trials, the automatic response activation leads to response
interference, resulting in longer RTs.
In the new, social version, one person was in charge of
the left response key and the other was in charge of the
right response key (similar as in Fig. 1, bottom). The cru-
cial question was whether interference between the left and
the right response that normally occurs within participants
would also be found across participants. The results of this
initial study and several further studies (e.g., Milanese et al.
2010; Welsh 2009) confirm this prediction. When partici-
pants responded to stimuli of a particular color, they were
faster in doing so when the stimuli appeared in a spatial
location that corresponded to the side of the response
location, compared to when the stimuli appeared on the
opposite side. This pattern was found both when partici-
pants acted alone (two-choice condition), choosing
between a left and a right response, and when they acted
Fig. 1 Illustration of neutral
trials (left column) and
incompatible trials (right
column) in the individual
condition (top row) and joint
condition (bottom row). In the
joint condition, the flankers on
incompatible trials were part of
the co-actor’s task rules
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together (joint go/no-go condition), with each individual in
the pair taking care of only one of the two possible
responses. Importantly, this spatial compatibility effect was
not observed when participants performed their half of the
task alone without the co-actor (individual go/no-go
condition).
Several studies suggest that task co-representation
effects occur even when the co-actor is invisible (Ruys and
Aarts 2010; Sebanz et al. 2005; Tsai et al. 2008; Vlainic
et al. 2010, but see Welsh et al. 2007 for a contradictory
result). This indicates that knowledge about a co-actor’s
task may be sufficient to modulate individual action plan-
ning. However, it is unclear whether task co-representation
effects are restricted to tasks involving automatic stimulus–
response (S–R) links, such as the Simon task, or whether
they are more general. Is a representation of an action
under the control of one’s co-actor only activated through
direct S–R links, or do co-actors represent each other’s
actions in such a way that even arbitrary S–R links can lead
to activation of the co-actor’s response?
Findings by Atmaca et al. (2008) indicate that co-rep-
resentation effects can be generalized to a task where
spatial S–R links are more indirect. In a joint SNARC
paradigm, one participant responded to odd numbers and
the other to even numbers, presented centrally on a com-
puter screen. It is known that individuals performing the
whole task alone are faster responding to small numbers
with a left key press and to large numbers with a right key
press, indicating that numbers are represented in terms of
magnitude on a mental number line proceeding from left to
right (Dehaene et al. 1993). The same SNARC effect was
found when participants performed the task together, sug-
gesting that co-representation effects can be generalized to
tasks where the spatial overlap between stimuli and
responses is indirect.
Sebanz et al. (2005) found that a nonspatial task inter-
fered with a spatial task; participants responding to a spa-
tial stimulus feature showed larger reaction times when
their co-actor responded to stimulus color at the same time.
However, this study focused on actions performed simul-
taneously. It is unknown whether performance of actions
carried out while the other actor is idle is also affected by
knowledge about the other’s task rules. Furthermore, task
rules assignment was not completely arbitrary, making it
difficult to generalize the results.
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether
co-representation effects occur in the absence of automatic
S–R links. Both in the joint Simon and in the joint SNARC
task, irrelevant stimulus features (spatial position and
numerosity, respectively) directly trigger activations of the
co-actor’s response. In the present study, we used the
Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974; see
explanations below), where links between stimuli and
responses are arbitrary (instructed). According to the
dimensional overlap model (Kornblum and Lee 1995), the
feature overlap in the Simon and in the SNARC task occurs
between the response set and the irrelevant stimulus
dimension (type 3 in their taxonomy). In contrast, the
overlap in the Flanker task occurs between the relevant and
an irrelevant stimulus dimension (type 4). The occurrence
of a joint Flanker effect would thus provide evidence that
co-actors represent the (arbitrary) task rules that govern
their partner’s performance.
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the joint Flanker effect
with two different sets of stimuli. In two further experi-
ments, we asked which contextual factors determine whe-
ther co-actors represent each other’s tasks. Experiment 3
investigated the role of the co-actor’s presence, and
Experiment 4 tested whether perceiving the co-actor as
acting intentionally is a necessary factor. Before reporting
the experiments, we shortly introduce the Flanker paradigm.
The Flanker task
The Flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974) is a well-
established experimental paradigm in cognitive psychol-
ogy. For more than three decades, it has been used in
attempts to separate different processing levels in hierar-
chical stage models of cognitive processing (Eriksen and
Schultz 1979; Miller 1988; for a critical discussion, see
Cohen and Shoup 1997) and in the study of response
selection processes in particular (Coles et al. 1985; Grice
and Gwynne 1985; Sanders and Lamers 2002). More
recently, the task has been extensively used in studies of
conflict resolution and error monitoring (e.g., Botvinick
et al. 2001; Van Veen et al. 2001).
In the standard Flanker task, participants respond to
different targets (e.g., letters, shapes, colors, etc.) by
pressing one of two different keys. Targets are surrounded
by distracting flankers that are either (1) the same as the
target (identical trials), (2) perceptually different from the
target but refer to the same response (compatible trials), (3)
perceptually different and refer to the opposite response as
the target (incompatible trials), or (4) perceptually different
and do not refer to any response (neutral trials). Note that
the flankers in (1), (2), and (3) may appear as targets on
other trials, whereas the flankers in (4) never appear as
targets (see Table 1 for the full set of target–flanker com-
binations used in Experiments 1, 3, and 4).
Participants’ RTs vary depending on the combination of
target and flankers. RTs on neutral trials provide a refer-
ence value, because flankers do not refer to any response.
For instance, if the task is to respond to the letters S and C
with a left response and the letters H and K with a right
response, the flanker U in the stimulus UUKUU will
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activate neither the right response nor the left response.
Compared to neutral trials, responses on compatible trials
are usually faster because flankers provide additional
activation of the response required by the target and thus
facilitate response selection (e.g., Eriksen and Schultz
1979). For instance, in the stimulus HHKHH, the flanker H
also activates the right response required by the target K.
RTs on identical trials are usually even faster than RTs on
compatible trials. In addition to activating the same
response as the target, perceptual processing is typically
facilitated because identical flankers provide additional
perceptual information (Cohen and Shoup 1997; Eriksen
and Eriksen 1979), such as in the stimulus KKKKK.
Finally, compared to neutral trials, RTs on incompatible
trials are slower because flankers activate the opposite
response as the target, which creates response interference
(Eriksen and Eriksen 1979; Eriksen and Schultz 1979). For
instance, in the stimulus SSKSS, the flanker S activates the
left response, whereas the target K requires the right
response. Note that, unlike in the Simon task where the
irrelevant spatial stimulus features directly activates a
spatially corresponding response, flankers can only activate
a response if the instructed S–R mappings are known to a
participant. The Flanker task is thus optimally suited for
investigating whether co-actors take into account each
other’s task rules.
The joint flanker task—predictions
We distributed the Flanker task among pairs of participants
so that each participant responded to two targets (letters in
Experiments 1, 3, 4; colors in Experiment 2) with only one
response, respectively. Participants performed the same go/
no-go task on their own (individual condition) and next to a
co-actor (joint condition). We predicted a larger difference
between RTs on incompatible trials and all other trials
types (identical, compatible, neutral) in the joint condition
compared to the individual condition. The reasoning for
this prediction is as follows: In the joint condition,
incompatible flankers require the co-actor’s response when
they occur in the target position. Due to the overlap
between relevant (target) and irrelevant (flankers) stimulus
features, incompatible flankers should trigger a represen-
tation of the other’s action, interfering with response
selection.
The dimensional overlap model predicts that in the
individual go/no-go condition, a residual Flanker effect
should also be present. While in the individual Simon go/
no-go task response interference does not occur when only
one response is available, in the individual Flanker go/no-
go task, there is still conflict between relevant and irrele-
vant stimulus features. This conflict should be more pro-
nounced on incompatible trials compared to neutral trials.
Neutral flankers never appear in the target position,
whereas incompatible flankers do, so that neutral flankers
will not activate as strong a tendency to inhibit a response
as incompatible flankers. To illustrate this, imagine a par-
ticipant responding to ‘‘H’’ and ‘‘K’’ in the individual
condition. In the no-go trial ‘‘CCSCC’’, the letter ‘‘S’’
requires inhibition. When the same letter is flanking the
target, as in the incompatible stimulus ‘‘SSHSS’’, ‘‘S’’ is
still associated with action inhibition, even though ‘‘S’’ is
not explicitly assigned to a competing action. Hence, even
in the individual condition, RTs on incompatible trials
should be slower than RTs on neutral trials (Heil et al.
2000).
In both conditions, neutral flankers do not refer to any
response, while identical and compatible flankers refer to
the same response as the target. In line with earlier results,
we expected RTs on identical trials to be fastest and RTs on
compatible trials to be faster than RTs on neutral trials.
However, we did not expect RTs on identical, compatible,
and neutral trials to be modulated by social setting, because
the flankers on these trials do not refer to a co-actor’s
response. To test the prediction that the slowing of RTs on
incompatible trials relative to the other trial types would be
more pronounced in the joint condition than in the indi-
vidual condition, we averaged RTs across identical, com-
patible, and neutral trials to obtain a baseline and
performed within-subject 2 9 2 ANOVAs with the factors
Stimulus Type (baseline vs. incompatible) and Condition
(individual vs. joint). That is, we compared RTs not pre-
dicted to be modulated by Condition (identical, compatible,
neutral stimuli) with RTs predicted to be modulated by
Condition (incompatible) and tested whether the difference
between these two types of trials interacted with Condition
(joint vs. individual).
If the slowing of RTs on incompatible trials compared
to the baseline was more pronounced in the joint condi-
tion compared to the individual condition, a significant
interaction between Stimulus Type and Condition should
be found. In order to test whether identical, compatible,
and neutral trials were affected by social setting, we
Table 1 Complete stimulus set of Experiments 1, 3, and 4
Identical Compatible Neutral Incompatible
Target
H HHHHH KKHKK UUHUU SSHSS
K KKKKK HHKHH UUKUU CCKCC
S SSSSS CCSCC UUSUU KKSKK
C CCCCC SSCSS UUCUU HHCHH
The letters ‘‘H’’ and ‘‘K’’ were assigned to one response key, the
letters ‘‘S’’ and ‘‘C’’ were assigned to the other response key. Letters
were presented white on black
374 Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:371–385
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conducted within-subject 2 9 3 ANOVAs with the factors
Stimulus Type (identical, compatible, neutral) and Condi-
tion (individual vs. joint). A main effect of Stimulus Type
was expected, with RTs being fastest on identical trials,
followed by compatible trials. A main effect of Condition
would indicate general differences in speed such as faster
performance in the joint condition (social facilitation). A
significant two-way interaction would indicate that, con-
trary to our predictions, social setting differentially affec-
ted performance on identical, neutral, and compatible
trials.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, participants performed a letter version of
the Flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974). In the joint
condition, two participants performed the task with each of
them responding to two of four target letters by pressing a
single-response key. The exact same go/no-go task was
performed without a co-actor in the individual condition.
As explained earlier, we predicted a slowing of RTs on
incompatible trials compared to the other stimulus types
(baseline) selectively in the joint condition. In order to
ensure that the material used in the individual and joint
conditions yields a standard Flanker effect, we also inclu-
ded a two-choice condition where single participants per-
formed left and right key presses in response to the four
target stimuli.
Methods
Participants
Forty-eight students (35 women) from Rutgers University,
NJ, USA, took part in Experiment 1. They ranged in age
from 17 to 39 (mean age 20.1 years). Thirty-two partici-
pants performed both the joint and the individual condi-
tions. Sixteen participants performed the two-choice task.
All participants received research credits for their partici-
pation in partial fulfillment of course requirements. They
all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Material and procedure
Participants were presented with arrays of five letters, with
the letter in the middle position constituting the target
letter. In the individual and joint conditions, participants
responded to two of four target letters. Targets were the
letters H, K, S, and C, with H and K assigned to one key,
and S and C assigned to the other key. The letters H, K, S,
C, and U served as flankers. The combination of these
target and flanker letters resulted in four stimulus types:
identical, compatible, neutral, and incompatible (see
Table 1 for all possible combinations of targets and
flankers). Participants always responded with the index
finger of the right hand. Exactly the same go/no-go task
was performed in the joint and individual conditions, the
only difference being that in the joint condition, two par-
ticipants were sitting side-by-side, whereas in the individ-
ual condition, there was an empty chair beside the single
participant. Target pairs (H, K vs. S, C), response keys (left
vs. right), and the order of conditions (joint vs. individual)
were counterbalanced across participants. Each participant
responded to the same target pair with the same key
throughout the entire experiment.
Each trial started with a fixation cross presented for
500 ms (centrally positioned, 0.41 9 0.41 horizontally
and vertically), followed by a blank for 500 ms, followed
by the stimulus picture (centrally positioned, 1.88 9 0.41
horizontally and vertically) that was presented for a max-
imum of 2,000 ms. Once the correct key was pressed, the
stimulus picture disappeared from the screen and the next
trial started. If a participant committed an error, they
received auditory error feedback. If an incorrect response
was performed in the joint condition, the stimulus remained
on the screen and the correct key remained functional until
the time limit of 2,000 ms was reached. Participants
received visual error feedback (‘‘too slow’’) if they took
more than 2,000 ms to respond. No-go stimuli in the
individual condition were presented for 800 ms, to roughly
adjust the presentation time to the joint condition. After
each trial, there was an intertrial interval of 1,000 ms.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were ver-
bally informed that they would be performing two different
conditions, acting alone in one condition and taking turns
with a second actor in the other condition. At the beginning
of each condition, participants were informed about their
stimulus–response assignments (Example, joint condition:
Person on the LEFT side, press the key in front of you if
the middle letter is ‘‘C’’ or ‘‘S’’. Person on the RIGHT side,
press the key in front of you if the middle letter is ‘‘H’’ or
‘‘K’’. Example, individual condition: Please press the key
in front of you if the middle letter is ‘‘C’’ or ‘‘S’’. Do not
respond if the middle letter is ‘‘H’’ or ‘‘K’’.) In both con-
ditions, participants were familiarized with the task (104
trials) before the experiment started. In the main experi-
ment, participants performed three blocks of 96 trials each.
All four trial types occurred equally often. At the beginning
of each block, participants were reminded of their stimulus
response mapping (H, K vs. S, C). In each experimental
block, the trials were presented in pseudo-random order.
In the two-choice condition, participants responded to
the same stimuli as in the individual and the joint condi-
tions. They were asked to respond to both pairs of target
letters with left and right key presses. The combinations of
Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:371–385 375
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target pairs (H, K vs. S, C) and response keys (left vs. right)
were counterbalanced across participants.
Results: joint and individual conditions
Only trials in which participants had responded correctly
were included in the RT analysis. Errors occurred on 2.5%
of all trials and were not further analyzed. Table 2 shows
mean RTs for each condition and each type of stimulus.
A within-subjects 2 9 2 ANOVA with the factors
Condition (joint vs. individual) and Stimulus Type (base-
line vs. incompatible) was computed on RTs. There was a
significant main effect for the factor Condition, F(1,
31) = 5.253, P \ .05, indicating that RTs in the joint
condition were faster than RTs in the individual condition.
There was also a significant main effect for the factor
Stimulus Type, F(1, 31) = 97.455, P \ .001, showing that
RTs on incompatible trials were slower than baseline RTs.
Importantly, there was a significant Condition 9 Stimulus
Type two-way interaction, F(1, 31) = 5.545, P \ .05,
demonstrating that the RT difference between incompatible
trials and baseline was larger in the joint condition than in
the individual condition (see Fig. 2, left side).
Additionally, a within-subjects 2 9 3 ANOVA with the
factors Condition (joint vs. individual) and Stimulus Type
(identical vs. compatible vs. neutral) was computed on
RTs. There were significant main effects for the factors
Condition, F(1, 31) = 8.266, P \ .01, and Stimulus Type,
F(2, 62) = 9.651, P \ .001, indicating that RTs in the joint
condition were faster than RTs in the individual condition
and that RTs differed significantly between the three
stimulus types. However, there was no significant Condi-
tion 9 Stimulus Type two-way interaction, F(2, 62) =
0.379, P = .686.
To determine whether the order in which the individual
and joint conditions were performed modulated the results,
we conducted a 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA with the within-sub-
jects factors Condition (joint condition vs. individual
condition) and Stimulus Type (baseline vs. incompatible),
and the between-subjects factor Order (joint condition first
vs. individual condition first). There was no indication that
order had any impact on the joint Flanker effect.
Results: two-choice condition
Errors occurred on 3.1% of all trials and were not further
analyzed. Table 2 shows mean RTs for each stimulus type.
A paired-samples t test was conducted to compare the
means of RTs between incompatible trials (mean: 697 ms)
and the baseline (mean: 626 ms). RTs on incompatible
trials were significantly slower, t(15) = 6.314, P \ .001.
Additionally, a one-way ANOVA was computed to com-
pare RTs on identical, compatible, and neutral trials. It
showed a main effect of Stimulus Type, F(2, 30) = 7.13,
P \ .01. RTs were significantly faster on identical trials
compared to compatible trials (t(15) = 4.852, P \ .001)
and neutral trials (t(15) = 2.315, P \ .05). The difference
between neutral and compatible trials was not significant
(t(15) = 1.319, P = .27).
Discussion
Pairs of participants performing the Eriksen flanker task
together showed a significant Flanker effect (larger RTs
on incompatible trials compared to identical, compatible,
and neutral trials). Importantly, the Flanker effect was
significantly larger in the joint condition compared to the
individual condition, where participants performed exactly
the same go/no-go task on their own. The most straight-
forward explanation for the larger RTs on incompatible
trials in the joint condition is that increased response
interference occurred. We suggest that this interference
occurred because each of the co-actors represented their
partner’s task rules in addition to their own. Therefore,
flankers that were part of the co-actor’s task (i.e., letters
that would require a response by the co-actor if they
appeared in the target position) activated a representation
Table 2 Average RTs (in ms) of Experiments 1–4, for each stimulus
type and each condition
Experiment
and condition
Identical Compatible Neutral Incompatible
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Experiment 1
Two-choice 611 221 640* 232 628 207 697* 239
Joint 403 109 415* 129 426 118 460* 141
Individual 429 146 445* 146 451 129 472* 137
Experiment 2
Two-choice 665 246 670 231 664 235 731* 252
Joint 474 155 508* 183 472* 159 534* 208
Individual 460 133 488* 150 475 156 498* 148
Experiment 3
Order IJ
Joint 448 104 463* 104 474* 123 493* 116
Individual 453 87 479* 110 479 110 489* 93
Order JI
Joint 434 99 443 92 448 101 475* 130
Individual 439 139 449 151 450 105 487* 140
Experiment 4
Intentional 448 121 467* 136 467 108 505* 174
Unintentional 474 150 502* 175 513 169 512 142
An asterisk (*) indicates that the respective RT significantly differs
from the RT to its left
376 Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:371–385
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of the co-actor’s action alternative, interfering with the
selection of one’s own response.
As expected, the RT pattern of identical, compatible,
and neutral trials was not modulated by Condition. How-
ever, reaction times were generally faster in the joint
condition than in the individual condition. This finding is
most likely due to social facilitation, the phenomenon that
people tend to act faster in the presence of another person,
especially when the task is relatively easy (e.g., Aiello and
Douthitt 2001; Guerin 1993; Zajonc 1965). This overall RT
difference cannot explain why the difference between
incompatible trials and baseline (average of identical,
compatible, neutral trials) was larger in the joint condition
than in the individual condition.
A significant Flanker effect was observed not only in the
joint condition but also in the individual condition (see
mean RTs in Table 2), as predicted by the dimensional
overlap model (Kornblum and Lee 1995). Incompatible
flankers appeared as targets on no-go trials, whereas neutral
flankers never appeared in the target position. Accordingly,
responses to incompatible flankers needed to be inhibited
when these appeared in the target position on no-go trials,
whereas neutral flankers never required inhibition. Similar
go/no-go Flanker effects have been found in previous
studies (Heil et al. 2000; Kopp et al. 1996).
Finally, the RT pattern obtained in the two-choice
condition showed the standard pattern of results observed
in studies on the Flanker effect. The lack of a difference
between RTs on neutral trials and RTs on compatible trials
is not uncommon. Typically, RTs on compatible trials are
slightly faster than RTs on neutral trials (Sanders and La-
mers 2002) but similar RTs for neutral and compatible
trials have been reported. For instance, Hazeltine et al.
(2003) found no difference between neutral and compatible
trials in a letter version of the Flanker task as well as in a
color version. Whereas incompatible flankers reliably
increase RTs, compatible flankers are known to produce
less-consistent results (Madden and Langley 2003). In
particular, it has been proposed that compatible flankers
may lead to a competition in the recognition of target and
flankers and thereby disrupt performance (Eriksen and
Schultz 1979; Grice and Gwynne 1985; Proctor and Fober
1985). Apparently, response interference dominated over
response facilitation in the present version of the task.
Experiment 2
It has been proposed that there are different components of
response selection in the Eriksen flanker task, some of
which depend on the stimulus material, whereas others are
independent of the stimulus material (Hazeltine et al.
2003). Comparing a letter and a color version of an
Eriksen flanker task, Hazeltine et al. found that different
areas in prefrontal cortex were active depending on the
type of stimulus information that needed to be inhibited.
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether the joint
Flanker effect can be generalized to a different set of
stimuli. This would indicate that response interference on
incompatible trials in the joint condition occurs indepen-
dently of the stimulus material. Participants performed a
color version of the Flanker task (Hazeltine et al. 2000),
following the exact same procedure as in Experiment 1. In
the color version, participants saw three colored circles and
were asked to respond to the color of the middle circle. We
predicted that the slowing of RTs on incompatible trials
compared to all other stimulus types (baseline) would be
more pronounced in the joint condition than in the indi-
vidual condition.
Method
Participants
Thirty-one students (15 women) from Rutgers University,
NJ, USA, took part in Experiment 2. They ranged in age
Fig. 2 Experiment 1 (left) and
Experiment 2 (right). Average
RTs for identical, neutral, and
compatible trials (baseline;
white bars) and incompatible
trials (black bars), in the joint
and in the individual condition
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from 16 to 50 (mean age 20.4 years). Sixteen participants
performed both the joint and the individual conditions.
Fifteen participants performed the two-choice task. All
participants received research credits for their participa-
tion. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Material and procedure
Stimuli consisted of three colored circles with the middle
circle constituting the target. Each participant responded to
two of four target colors. Red and purple were assigned to
one key, blue and green to the other key. The colors red,
purple, blue, green, and gray served as flankers. In order to
enhance visual contrast, the colored circles (centrally
positioned, 1.31 9 0.25 horizontally and vertically) were
surrounded by a black rectangle (centrally positioned,
5.31 9 3.6 horizontally and vertically), while the rest of
the screen was white. After practice (88 trials), participants
performed three blocks of 80 trials each. Apart from these
changes, the procedure was exactly the same as in Exper-
iment 1.
Results: joint and individual conditions
Errors occurred on 1.2% of all trials. Only trials in which
participants had responded correctly were included in the
RT analysis. Table 2 shows mean RTs for each condition
and each stimulus type.
A within-subjects 2 9 2 ANOVA with the factors
Condition (joint vs. individual) and Stimulus Type (base-
line vs. incompatible) showed a significant main effect of
Stimulus Type, F(3, 15) = 22.595, P \ .001. RTs on
incompatible trials were larger than baseline RTs. Fur-
thermore, there was a significant Condition 9 Stimulus
Type two-way interaction, F(1, 15) = 16.169, P \ .01,
demonstrating that the RT difference between incompatible
trials and baseline was larger in the joint condition than in
the individual condition (see Fig. 2, right side). There was
no significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 15) = 2.219,
P = 157.
A within-subjects 2 9 3 ANOVA with the factors
Condition (joint condition vs. individual condition) and
Stimulus Type (identical vs. compatible vs. neutral)
revealed a significant main effect of Stimulus Type (F(2,
30) = 13.338, P \ .001), indicating that overall RTs dif-
fered between types of stimuli. There were no further
significant main effects or interactions.
A 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects factors
Condition (joint condition vs. individual condition) and
Stimulus Type (baseline vs. incompatible), and the
between-subjects factor Order (joint condition first vs.
individual condition first) provided no indication for order
of conditions modulating the joint Flanker effect.
Results: two-choice condition
Errors occurred on 3.7% of all trials and were not further
analyzed. Table 2 shows mean RTs for each stimulus type.
A paired-samples t test revealed a significant difference
between stimulus types (baseline vs. incompatible),
t(14) = 3.592, P \ .01. RTs on incompatible trials (mean:
731 ms) were larger than baseline RTs (mean: 666 ms). A
one-way ANOVA comparing RTs on identical, compatible,
and neutral trials did not show a significant main effect of
timulus type, F(2, 28) = .413, P = .665. Accordingly,
two-sided t tests did not show a significant difference
between identical, compatible, and neutral trials (all
P [ .05).
Discussion
As in Experiment 1, the slowing of RTs on incompatible
trials compared to all other stimulus types (baseline) was
larger in the joint condition than in the individual condi-
tion. This provides further evidence for the assumption that
co-actors represented not only the task rules according to
which they acted, but also the task rules according to which
their partner acted.
In contrast to Experiment 1, no effects of social facili-
tation were observed. This could be due to stimulus dif-
ferences or differences in the sample. Importantly, this
demonstrates that the interaction between Condition and
Stimulus Type does not hinge on a general speed difference
between the individual and joint conditions.
Unexpectedly, RTs were notably fast on neutral trials in
all conditions. Possibly, the gray stimuli used as neutral
flankers created a particularly salient contrast to the other
colors and thus facilitated perceptual processing (see
Eriksen and Eriksen 1974 for similarity manipulations of
neutral flankers). Since this facilitation on neutral flankers
occurred across all conditions, the interpretation of the
differences between the joint and individual conditions is
not affected.
As expected, the two-choice task also showed a signif-
icant flanker effect. The lack of a difference between
identical and compatible trials in this condition is likely
due to the particular stimulus material used (Cohen and
Shoup 1997) and has been found in previous studies (e.g.,
Flowers 1990; Miller 1991).
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that co-actors rep-
resent each other’s stimulus–response mappings. However,
it is unclear whether knowledge about the co-actor’s task
rules is sufficient for the joint Flanker effect to occur, or
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whether observing one’s partner’s actions is necessary.
Previous studies on joint performance of a spatial com-
patibility task suggest that believing to be acting together
with another individual is sufficient (Ruys and Aarts 2010;
Sebanz et al. 2005; Tsai et al. 2008; Vlainic et al. 2010).
However, in these studies, the links between stimuli and
responses were automatic, and thus, the stimuli may have
contributed to keeping a representation of the co-actor’s
response alternative active. Do people take into account the
task rules of an invisible co-actor even when they both act
according to arbitrary S–R mappings?
To address this question, participants in Experiment 3
were instructed to perform the Flanker task with a co-actor
seated in another room. In fact, participants never inter-
acted with another person, but performed the task by
themselves, either believing that they were performing the
task with a co-actor or believing that they were performing
the task on their own (as in Tsai et al. 2008).
Method
Participants
Fifty-seven students (33 women) from Rutgers University,
NJ, USA, took part in Experiment 3, performing both the
individual and the ‘fake’ joint condition. Participants ran-
ged in age from 17 to 39 (mean age 20.8 years). All par-
ticipants received research credits for their participation.
They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Material and procedure
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. In both condi-
tions, there was only one response key located in front of
the participant. Participants were seated centrally in front
of the computer screen. There was no empty chair next to
the participant.
The course of each trial was the same as in Experiment
1, with the following exceptions: The fixation cross (cen-
trally positioned) measured 0.25 9 0.25 horizontally and
vertically, and the stimulus picture (centrally positioned)
measured 1.7 9 0.4 horizontally and vertically. Partici-
pants received feedback in the form of a green check mark
if they had responded within the 2,000-ms time window on
go trials. In the joint condition, participants saw the same
check mark after every no-go trial, to maintain the belief
that a co-actor was taking care of the other half of the task.
The green check was presented for 500 ms. After an ITI of
500 ms, the next trial started. No-go stimuli in both con-
ditions were presented for either 400, 500, 600, 700, or
800 ms, to roughly adjust the presentation time to the RTs
of a real co-actor. These presentation times were equally
frequent and occurred in randomized order across consec-
utive trials.
As in Experiment 1 and 2, once participants arrived at
the laboratory, they were verbally informed that they would
be performing two different conditions, acting alone in one
condition and together in the other condition. In the joint
condition, the experimenter told the participants that they
would be performing the task together with her, but sitting
in different rooms. The experimenter said she would be
sitting in the room opposite of the testing room, without
specifying her exact sitting position. In order to foster the
belief that the participant was interacting with the experi-
menter in another room, the following manipulation was
built into the joint condition. After the experimenter had
left, participants were asked to start the experiment by
pressing the space bar. After the space bar was pressed,
there was a blank (6,000 ms in the training phase, 4,000 ms
in block one, 5,000 ms in block two, 3,000 ms in block
three, and 6,000 ms in block four) preceding the following
message: ‘‘Both persons are now ready to start the exper-
iment. The training phase/block X(1, 2, 3) will start auto-
matically in 10 s’’, which was presented for 10,000 ms.
Then, the first trial started. In both conditions, participants
were first familiarized with the task (88 trials), and then
performed three blocks of 80 trials each. After the exper-
iment, participants were asked whether they indeed
believed that they had performed the task alone in the
individual condition and together with the experimenter in
the joint condition, and were subsequently debriefed.
Results
Seventeen of the fifty-seven participants reported suspect-
ing that the experimenter was not performing the task in the
other room (joint condition) or that they were not per-
forming the task alone (individual condition). These par-
ticipants were removed from further analyses. Note that
this relatively high number is due to our strict exclusion
criterion; we excluded every participant who voiced any
doubt that the experimenter had performed her task in the
other room to make sure that our findings reflect the per-
formance of participants who were truly convinced that
they were performing the task with a co-actor.
Errors occurred on 0.9% of the trials. Only trials in
which participants had responded correctly were included
in RT analysis. Table 2 shows mean RTs for each condi-
tion and each stimulus type.
A within-subjects 2 9 2 ANOVA with the factors Con-
dition (joint condition vs. individual condition) and Stimulus
Type (baseline vs. incompatible) was computed. There was a
significant main effect of Stimulus Type, F(1, 39) = 94.198,
P \ .001, showing that RTs on incompatible trials were
larger than baseline RTs (identical, compatible, and neutral).
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Against our expectations, there was no significant Condition
9 Stimulus Type two-way interaction, F(1, 39) = 0.396,
P = .533, indicating that the size of the Flanker effect was
not modulated by Condition.
A within-subjects 2 9 3 ANOVA with the factors
Condition (joint condition vs. individual condition) and
Stimulus Type (identical vs. compatible vs. neutral)
revealed a significant main effect of Stimulus Type (F(2,
112) = 33.790, P \ . 001). There were no further signifi-
cant main effects or interactions.
To determine whether the order in which the individual
and joint conditions had been performed modulated the
results, we conducted a 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA with the
within-subjects factors Condition (joint vs. individual) and
Stimulus Type (baseline vs. incompatible), and the
between-subjects factor Order (joint condition first vs.
individual condition first). There was a significant Condi-
tion 9 Stimulus Type 9 Order three-way interaction, F(1,
38) = 6.419, P \ .05. The difference between incompati-
ble trials and baseline was larger in the joint condition than
in the individual condition, but only when the individual
condition had been performed first (see Fig. 3, right side).
None of the other effects were significant.
In a next step, we analyzed the results of the group that
had performed the individual condition first separately. A
2 9 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Condition
(joint vs. individual) and Stimulus Type (baseline vs.
incompatible) showed a significant main effect for the
factor Stimulus Type, F(1, 19) = 55.912, P \ .001, as well
as the predicted Condition 9 Stimulus Type two-way
interaction, F(1, 19) = 5.623, P \ .05.
Additionally, a 2 9 3 9 2 ANOVA with the within-
subjects factors Condition (joint condition vs. individual
condition) and Stimulus Type (identical vs. compatible vs.
neutral), and the between-subjects factor Order (joint
condition first vs. individual condition first) was computed
on RTs. There was a significant main effect for the factor
Stimulus Type, F(2, 76) = 21.43, P \ .001. There were no
further significant main effects or interactions.
Discussion
Overall, Experiment 3 did not show the same pattern of
results as the previous experiments. When participants
believed to be interacting with another person, the differ-
ence between incompatible trials and baseline was similar
in the joint and individual conditions. However, a closer
look at the data revealed that the order in which participants
completed the two conditions modulated the results. When
the individual condition preceded the joint condition, the
findings were the same as in the two previous experiments.
In contrast, when the joint condition preceded the individual
condition, there was a large difference between incompat-
ible trials and baseline in both conditions.
In our view, the most likely explanation for this pattern is
that participants who performed the individual condition
after the joint condition may have been unable to shed the
representation of the other actor and/or their task rule once
the task had been encoded as a joint one. That is, once
participants believed they had performed the task with
another actor, they kept thinking of the other actor and/or
their task even when acting alone. This interpretation is
supported by the finding that the Flanker effect in the joint
condition did not differ depending on Order (t(38) = 0.303;
P = .764), while the Flanker effect in the individual con-
dition did (t(38) = 2.914; P \ .01). This indicates that,
while task co-representation occurred in the joint condition
irrespective of Order, participants represented the other task
in the individual condition when they had first executed the
joint condition. Furthermore, a comparison with Experi-
ment 1 showed a significant Condition (joint vs. individual)
9 Stimulus Type (baseline vs. incompatible) 9 Order (joint
condition first vs. individual condition first) 9 Experiment
(Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3) four-way interaction (F(1,
68) = 7.638, P \ .01), indicating that the joint Flanker
effect differed between the two experiments, depending on
the order in which conditions were conducted. However,
there was no significant Condition 9 Stimulus Type 9
Experiment three-way interaction (F(1, 68) = 2.974,
P = .089). That is, the overall joint Flanker effect was not
modulated by experimental setting, suggesting that the
observed order effect in Experiment 3 was related to the
belief manipulation. Beliefs may be harder to switch on and
off compared to having direct evidence about the presence
or absence of one’s co-actor. Taken together, the results of
Experiment 3 are in line with earlier studies showing that
the mere belief to be acting together with another person
can be sufficient for task co-representation to occur,
Fig. 3 Average RTs for identical, neutral, and compatible trials
(baseline; white bars) and incompatible trials (black bars) in the joint
and in the individual condition. Left results from participants who
performed the joint condition prior to the individual condition. Right
results from participants who performed the individual condition prior
to the joint condition
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generalizing this finding to a situation where co-actors
perform tasks with arbitrary S–R mappings.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4, we addressed a further boundary condition
for task co-representation. Previous research by Tsai et al.
(2008) indicated that the intentionality of the co-actor may
matter. A joint Simon effect was observed when partici-
pants believed that another person in a different room per-
formed a complementary go/no-go task, but not when they
believed that a computer took care of the same go/no-go
task. However, since humans and computers differ in so
many ways, one cannot be sure that the co-actor’s inten-
tionality was the key factor. It remains unclear how par-
ticipants represented the computer—as an unintentional
agent, as a nonbiological agent, or just as the nonexistence
of an agent, to name just a few possibilities. To test whether
task co-representation occurs specifically when people
perceive a co-actor as acting intentionally, we compared
performance when participants acted next to a co-actor
acting intentionally and when they acted next to the same
co-actor, but her actions were controlled by a machine.
Participants performed the joint Flanker task (letter
version) twice with the same confederate. In the ‘‘inten-
tional co-actor’’ condition, the confederate performed her
task by actively pressing a key when it was her turn. In the
‘‘unintentional co-actor’’ condition, the confederate’s fin-
ger was pulled down by an electromagnet each time it was
her turn to act (see Fig. 4, bottom). This ensured that the
two conditions were identical but for the cause of the
confederate’s actions. We predicted a larger joint Flanker
effect in the intentional compared to the unintentional co-
actor condition.
Method
Participants
Twenty students (15 women) from Rutgers University, NJ,
USA, took part in the experiment. Participants ranged in
age from 18 to 35 (mean age 20.8 years). All participants
received research credits for their participation. They all
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Material and procedure
Participants performed both conditions with the same
confederate. In the intentional co-actor condition, the
confederate was actively performing her part of the Flanker
task. In the unintentional co-actor condition, the confed-
erate was wearing an iron ring on her right index finger. On
trials requiring her response, the computer activated the
electromagnet, which attracted the iron ring held closely
above the magnet. This resulted in the confederate’s finger
being pulled down to hit the magnet (see Fig. 4, bottom).
Participants were told that the magnet functioned like a
response key and that a response was recorded the moment
the finger touched the magnet. Participants had the
opportunity to try out the electromagnet and went through a
training block before the experiment started.
Stimuli and the course of each trial were the same as in
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. Stimuli the
confederate passively responded to in the unintentional co-
actor condition were presented for 800 ms, to roughly
adjust the presentation time to the intentional co-actor
condition. After 600 ms, the electromagnet was activated,
and the force of the magnet pulled down the confederate’s
finger. The magnet was deactivated at the end of stimulus
presentation.
Target stimuli and the position of response keys were
counterbalanced across participants. All participants per-
formed the unintentional co-actor condition first. This was to
avoid that once participants perceived the co-actor as acting
intentionally, they would continue to ascribe intentionality
to her actions in the unintentional co-actor condition.
Results
Incorrect responses (1.6%) were removed from RT analy-
ses. Table 2 shows mean RTs for each condition and each
stimulus type.
A 2 9 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects factors
Condition (intentional co-actor vs. unintentional co-actor)
Fig. 4 Average RTs for identical, neutral, and compatible trials
(baseline; white bars) and incompatible trials (black bars) in the
intentional co-actor condition (left) and in the unintentional co-actor
condition (right)
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and Stimulus Type (baseline vs. incompatible) revealed a
significant main effect of Stimulus Type (F(1, 19) =
21.133, P \ .001) and a significant Condition 9 Stimulus
Type two-way interaction (F(1, 19) = 10.277, P \ .01).
As predicted, the difference between incompatible trials
and baseline was significantly larger in the intentional
co-actor condition (see Fig. 4). There was a tendency for a
main effect of Condition (F(1, 19) = 3.395, P = .081).
Overall RTs tended to be faster in the intentional compared
to the unintentional co-actor condition.
To compare the Flanker effect in the unintentional
condition with that of the individual condition of Experi-
ment 1, we conducted a 2 9 2 ANOVA with the between-
subject factor Experiment 1 (1 vs. 4) and the within-subject
factor Trial Type (baseline vs. incompatible). To make sure
that the data are comparable, we only included data from
participants in Experiment 1 who had performed the indi-
vidual condition first (because all participants in Experi-
ment 4 performed the unintentional condition first). There
was no significant interaction, F(1, 50) = 1.238, P = .274,
supporting the conclusion that the co-actor’s task was not
represented in the unintentional condition.
A further 2 9 3 ANOVA with the within-subjects fac-
tors Condition (intentional co-actor vs. unintentional co-
actor) and Stimulus Type (identical vs. compatible vs.
neutral) revealed significant main effects for the factors
Condition (F(1, 19) = 9.559, P \ .01) and Stimulus Type
(F(2, 38) = 12.029, P \ .001). RTs were significantly
faster when acting next to an intentional co-actor. There
was no significant interaction.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 show that stronger response
interference on incompatible trials occurred when the co-
actor acted intentionally compared to when her actions were
externally controlled. This provides clear evidence that the
perceived intentionality of a co-actor modulates task co-
representation (Tsai et al. 2008). RTs were overall faster in
the intentional co-actor condition. This may either reflect
social facilitation effects or a slowing of responses in the
unintentional co-actor condition induced by the relatively
slow responses of the co-actor. However, the overall RT
difference cannot explain why the difference between
incompatible trials and other stimulus types (identical,
compatible, neutral) was larger when the co-actor acted
intentionally.
General discussion
The aim of the present study was to test whether co-actors
take into account the task rules governing each other’s
performance in a paradigm where the links between stimuli
and responses are arbitrary. Using different stimulus sets
(letters and colors), Experiments 1 and 2 provided con-
verging evidence that co-actors represented each other’s
task rules. Specifically, participants responded slower to
the same stimuli when the flankers referred to the co-
actor’s task, compared to when the flankers referred to their
own task or did not refer to any task. This joint Flanker
effect suggests that when two people perform independent
tasks next to each other, they keep in mind both task
rules—their own and the co-actor’s. This extends earlier
studies on joint task performance that focused on tasks
including automatic stimulus–response links. The present
findings demonstrate that stimuli pertaining to a co-actor’s
task activate representations of the co-actor’s actions even
when the links between stimuli and responses are arbitrary.
The results of Experiment 3 provided evidence that
believing to be performing the Flanker task together with
another person can be sufficient to elicit a joint Flanker
effect. Whereas results from variants of the joint Simon
task indicate that co-representation effects involve spatial
coding of one’s responses relative to the co-actor’s
(Guagnano et al. 2010; Milanese et al. in press), the results
of Experiment 3 demonstrate that, for cognitive paradigms
using arbitrary S–R mappings, task co-representation can
also occur when the precise spatial position of a co-actor
relative to oneself is unknown and all that is known is the
other’s S–R mapping. In addition, the results suggest that
once participants had represented the other’s task, they
retained this task set even when they were led to believe
that they were now on their own. It almost seemed as if
they could not get rid of the imagined co-actor in their
mind.
Experiment 4 demonstrated that task co-representation
depends on perceiving the co-actor as performing her task
intentionally. Participants showed a joint Flanker effect
when performing the task with a co-actor in control of her
actions, but not when they performed the same task with a
co-actor whose actions were controlled by an electromag-
net. Whereas previous studies left open why inanimate
agents’ tasks were ignored, the present results point to the
co-actor’s intentionality as a key factor. Our results provide
clear evidence that human sensitivity to intentional action,
which already manifests itself in infancy (e.g., Sommer-
ville and Woodward 2005), leads us to share others’ tasks
only when we think that they act by their own will.
The standard Flanker effect is assumed to arise at the
level of response selection, because target and flankers
activate two different responses (Eriksen and Schultz 1979;
Grice and Gwynne 1985). The joint Flanker effect can be
explained in a similar way. As each participant forms a
representation of the co-actor’s S–R mappings, incompat-
ible flankers activate a representation of the co-actor’s
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response. Accordingly, the slower RTs on incompatible
trials would reflect a response selection conflict.
It is possible, however, that the slowing of RTs on
incompatible trials in the joint condition does not reflect
interference between two competing response activations
but instead is due to increased response inhibition triggered
by the flankers. EEG studies using the joint Simon task
have found evidence for increased inhibition on no-go
trials where the co-actor needed to respond, compared to
individual no-go trials (Sebanz et al. 2006; Tsai et al.
2008). It could be that no-go stimuli in the joint condition
of the Flanker task become associated with increased
inhibition, so that when these stimuli are flankers (incom-
patible go trials), participants need to overcome the ten-
dency to inhibit their actions. As more inhibition occurs on
joint no-go trials, more conflict occurs on incompatible
trials in the joint condition compared to the individual
condition.
Furthermore, participants in the joint condition may
have represented the whole set of task rules in a qualita-
tively different way. In particular, they may have refor-
mulated the task rules to distinguish between stimuli
requiring ‘‘my response’’ and stimuli requiring ‘‘your
response’’. Stimuli that required ‘‘your response’’ sur-
rounding a stimulus requiring ‘‘my response’’ (incompati-
ble stimuli) may have created a turn-taking conflict because
people needed to figure out whose turn it was (Philipp and
Prinz 2010). In support of this view, an fMRI study, con-
trasting joint and individual performance of a go/no-go task
(Sebanz et al. 2007), found that in the joint condition, there
was higher activation in areas involved in self-other dis-
tinction (e.g., Brass et al. 2005) and increased self-aware-
ness (e.g., Mitchell et al. 2006). This could be interpreted
as evidence that people form a hierarchical task represen-
tation in social situations with self/other on top (Roepstorff
and Frith 2004), and the particular tasks and actions rep-
resented lower down in the hierarchy.
Needless to say, many questions about the boundary
conditions of task co-representation remain. How cogni-
tively demanding can each individual’s task be for task co-
representation to still occur? For example, does the com-
plexity of the S–R mapping at hand or the number of
response alternatives determine whether shared task rep-
resentations are formed? Do participants also co-represent
S–R mappings if there is more than one co-actor? Is
working memory load a limiting factor, and if so, can this
limit be expanded by introducing a situation where the co-
actors have an explicit advantage of taking each other into
account? These and many more questions need to be
addressed in future studies.
Selectively sharing tasks with intentional actors may
be functional both in terms of collaboration as well as in
terms of competition. It is crucial for cooperation
because it allows one to perform different parts of a joint
task (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007), to predict others’
actions (Knoblich and Jordan 2003; Sebanz and Knoblich
2009), and to monitor their errors (van Schie et al.
2004). More generally, it may reflect humans’ unique
tendency toward joint commitments (Warneken and
Tomasello 2006). However, keeping others’ tasks in
mind may also be helpful for outperforming others in
competitive situations (e.g., De Bruijn et al. 2008; Ruys
and Aarts 2010).
For now, we would like to conclude that people have a
remarkable tendency to take into account what others are
doing even when this is not required. This tendency may
have its origins in requirements of joint action. Many forms
of joint action require that people anticipate what others are
going to do next. Clearly, representing others’ tasks pro-
vides a powerful means for predicting their actions in
addition to observing what they are doing. Most impor-
tantly, it allows individuals to rely on cues in the envi-
ronment to know what others are likely going to do, thus
creating a type of common ground (Clark 1996) that is not
necessarily bound to language. A challenge for future work
will be to clarify how task co-representation works in
concert with more fine-grained predictive mechanisms that
are crucial for the temporal coordination of actions and
higher-level mechanisms employed in more sophisticated
forms of social interactions.
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